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1 Introduction
In financial markets, there is a unique phenomenon where investors appear reluctant to realize
losses and eager to realize gains; that is, investors seem to have a preference for selling winning
stocks too early and holding losing stocks too long. This pattern has been labeled the disposition
eﬀect by Shefrin and Statman (1985) and cannot be explained by traditional trading explanations.
For instance, Odean (1998) found this eﬀect even after accounting for portfolio rebalancing and
trading costs. Similarly, Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) and Ferris et al. (1987) consider trading
volume and find that the disposition eﬀect dominates tax-related motives for selling stocks at a
loss.
The disposition eﬀect has also been discovered in the Finnish stock market (Grinblatt and Kelo-
harju, 2001), Finnish apartment market (Einio and Puttonen, 2006), and in the sale of residential
housing (Genesove and Mayer, 2001). Furthermore, it has been found for professional investors at
an Israeli brokerage house (Shapira and Venezia, 2001); although, Dhar and Zhu (2002) find that
investors with less trading experience exhibit a stronger disposition eﬀect. Experimental evidence
has further supported the disposition eﬀect (Weber and Camerer, 1998; Andreassen, 1988). We
refer to Barber and Odean (2005) for a more in-depth review of the disposition eﬀect.
Several explanations for the disposition eﬀect were proposed by Shefrin and Statman (1985),
including loss aversion, mental accounting, seeking pride and avoiding regret, and self control.
Much of the literature to date on the disposition eﬀect has concentrated on loss aversion, which
we explain in further detail below. In this paper, we focus on how anticipating regret and pride
in a dynamic setting may cause investors to optimally follow a strategy in which they sell winning
stocks and hold losing stocks; that is, we model how anticipating regret and pride can help explain
the disposition eﬀect.
As mentioned, loss aversion has been suggested as one explanation for the disposition eﬀect
by Shefrin and Statman (1985) and also by several of the empirical papers which document the
disposition eﬀect in data (Odean, 1998; Lakonishok and Smidt, 1986; Ferris et al 1987; Grinblatt
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and Keloharju, 2001; Shapira and Venezia, 2001; Dhar and Zhu, 2002). Loss aversion as part
of prospect theory was proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and argues that people make
decisions considering gains and losses relative to some reference point rather than wealth levels.
Individuals who are loss-averse have preferences which are risk-seeking over losses and risk-averse
over gains. The intuition behind how loss aversion can explain the disposition eﬀect is that a
winning stock is considered a gain, and as individuals are risk-averse in this domain, they will sell
the stock. On the other hand, a losing stock would be considered a loss and being risk-seeking in
this domain would cause the investor to hold the stock.
Most previous studies that consider the disposition eﬀect are empirical and list loss aversion
as an explanation for the eﬀect. More recently, a few papers have formally modeled loss averse
preferences in portfolio choice problems. Gomes (2005) finds that the optimal portfolio choice with
loss-averse investors would be consistent with the disposition eﬀect. Kyle et al. (2006) examine the
liquidation decision of a project with loss-averse preferences and also find optimal behavior that is
consistent with the disposition eﬀect. Yet, both papers do not consider the initial decision. That is,
the investor is endowed with the stock or the project and the issue of whether a loss-averse investor
would even buy the stock or invest in the project initially is not considered. In contrast, Hens
and Vlcek (2005) and Barberis and Xiong (2006) take the initial decision into consideration and
find that loss aversion cannot explain the disposition eﬀect with short time horizons. The equity
premium must be so high for loss averse investors to initially invest in the stock that subsequent
optimal behavior is not consistent with the disposition eﬀect. In fact, Barberis and Xiong (2006)
show that this often implies momentum trading by the investor, i.e. the opposite of the disposition
eﬀect: keeping winning and selling losing stocks. Only when the number of trading periods is large,
Barberis and Xiong (2006) show that the equity premium can be suﬃciently low to both make the
investor willing to invest initially in the stock and exhibit optimal behavior which is consistent with
the disposition eﬀect.
Another explanation for the disposition eﬀect suggested by Shefrin and Statman (1985) and
examined in this paper is regret and pride, which has recently been supported with experimental
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evidence (O’Curry Fogel and Berry, 2006). The idea is that if the stock has gone down one regrets
the investment, and in hoping that the stock price will rise in the next period and thereby avoid
regret, holds the stock. If the stock has gone up, however, an individual wants to feel pride for
having made such a good investment and therefore sells the stock; if he had held it and then the
price fell, he would have foregone feeling pride. Wanting to feel pride and delaying regret is what
causes investors to realize gains more quickly than losses.
Although the explanation seems intuitive, as it seems with loss aversion, it is not as straight-
forward to argue that preferences which include regret and pride would give rise to the disposition
eﬀect in a dynamic setting. For instance, if the stock rose over one period and the investor sells it,
but then the stock rises again over the following period, the investor would feel regret from having
sold the stock. Therefore, anticipating regret over both periods, in this instance, could cause the
investor to hold the stock after the first period.
As far as we know, no work to date has been done on formally analyzing how preferences with
regret and pride could predict the disposition eﬀect. In this paper, such a model is developed.
Yet, considering a dynamic setting with regret and pride raises some interesting questions and thus
requires certain assumptions to be made. For instance, does the investor experience future regret
or pride only for the current investment decision or including all decisions already made in the past?
When does the investor experience regret - at the final period or during intermediate periods? In a
dynamic setting, some decisions will elicit regret and others pride. How do these feelings interact
and compound over time? Furthermore, if the investor does not hold the stock, does he know how
it did and can he experience regret then from not holding it if it does well (or pride if it performs
poorly)?
In what follows, we will state and explain the assumptions with respect to those questions under
which anticipating regret and pride causes individuals to sell stocks that have gained recently and
hold stocks that have lost. Therefore, we conclude that the disposition eﬀect can occur if investors
experience regret and pride with regard to their investment decisions.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce the model, the as-
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sumptions, and preferences that allow individuals to consider regret and pride. In Section 3, we
examine the optimal portfolio choice problem and provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
the investor’s optimal strategy to be consistent with the disposition eﬀect. In Section 4, we discuss
the robustness of our assumptions. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 Model and Preferences
Regret is the ex-post feeling of an individual that his ex-ante decision turned out to be suboptimal
with respect to the resolved uncertainty; that is, the individual’s ex-post level of wealth could have
been higher with an foregone alternative decision. Equivalently, pride is the ex-post feeling that
the ex-ante decision turned out to be better than some foregone alternative decision. In this setting,
an individual makes a decision considering the anticipated disutility or additional utility derived
from regret or pride.
Regret theory was initially formulated by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) and has
been shown in both the theoretical and empirical literature to explain individual behavior. Bell
(1982) depicted how regret could explain preferences for both insurance and gambling and Braun
and Muermann (2004) found that preferences which include regret can explain the preference for low
deductibles in personal insurance markets. In a static framework, regret has also been incorporated
more recently into asset pricing and portfolio choice models by Muermann et al. (2006) and Gollier
and Salanié (2005). We contribute to this literature by considering a portfolio choice problem in a
dynamic setting. In addition to the eﬀect that the possibility of intermediate portfolio adjustment
has on the portfolio allocation, regret and pride raises some interesting questions with respect to
the dynamic nature of those feelings. In the following, we introduce a model that is simple yet
rich enough to capture those issues.
There are two assets: a risk-free asset (bond) with a zero normalized return and a risky asset
(stock) with a stochastic return x˜t per period. We consider only one risky asset to be consistent
with the mental accounting framework noted by Thaler (1985) and supported by Gross (1982); the
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idea is that decision makers diﬀerentiate gambles into separate accounts, applying their preferences
to each account, and ignoring the interaction between them. In this manner, investors would view
each stock they hold individually and therefore we only consider one here.
We assume that the risky returns are independent and identically distributed across periods
and take the two values x+ > 0 > x− with probability p and 1− p in each period. The individual
is endowed with initial wealth w0 and can only invest all of his wealth in one of the two assets.
There are two periods. At t = 0 the investor decides whether to invest his wealth, w0, into the
stock or bond. At t = 1 the investor observes his realized level of wealth, w1, and decides again
whether to invest it into the stock or bond. At t = 2 all assets are liquidated and the investor
observes and consumes his final level of wealth, w2.
The restriction that the individual cannot split his wealth between the two assets is consistent
with the discussion and analysis in Shefrin and Statman (1985) and Odean (1998) which is based
on stock trading records of individual investors. Alternative settings include the purchase and
sale of an indivisible asset such, e.g. housing, or the investment in and liquidation of a project as
in Kyle et al. (2006) who consider such decisions with loss-averse preferences. Our model would
thus speak to the empirical evidence of the disposition eﬀect in the real estate market provided by
Genesove and Mayer (2001) and Einio and Puttonen (2006).
We follow Bell (1982, 1983) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) by implementing the following
two-attribute utility function to incorporate regret and pride in investor’s preferences
v (w) = u (w)− g(u(walt)− u (w)). (1)
The first attribute represents the risk-aversion of the individual and is characterized by the individ-
ual’s utility function of actual level of wealth, w. We assume that the utility function u (·) exhibits
CRRA preferences, i.e.
u (w) =
w1−γ
1− γ (2)
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for γ 6= 1 and u (w) = ln (w) for γ = 1 where γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. This
implies that the time horizon has no eﬀect on the optimal portfolio allocation of an individual who
does not consider regret and pride in his decision. That is, the individual makes his decision as if
he was myopic. Additionally, we assume that stock returns satisfy
p
¡
1 + x+
¢1−γ
+ (1− p)
¡
1 + x−
¢1−γ
> 1 (3)
for γ 6= 1 and (1 + x+)p (1− x−)1−p > 1 for γ = 1. This assumption implies that the risk premium
is high enough such that an individual who does not consider regret and pride finds it optimal to
invest in the stock in all periods. Therefore, portfolio rebalancing cannot explain the disposition
eﬀect. This allows us to focus on how regret and pride influence the optimal portfolio allocation.
The second attribute represents the individual’s feeling of regret or pride towards the “fictitious”
level of wealth, walt, the individual would have obtained from a foregone alternative. If the actual
level of wealth, w, falls below the alternative level of wealth, walt, the individual regrets his decision;
otherwise the individual feels pride. The function g (·) measures the amount of regret and pride
that the investor experiences and we assume that it is increasing and convex with g (0) = 0; that is,
the individual weighs the disutility incurred from regret relatively more than the additional utility
derived from pride. This assumption is supported in the literature (Thaler, 1980; Kahneman and
Tversky, 1982) and has recently found experimental support by Bleichrodt et al., 2006.
We assume that the individual incurs the disutility or additional utility from regret or pride
only at the final period. Similar to the assumption that there is no intermediate consumption, we
assume that the individual does not incur regret or pride in intermediate periods. The investor
thus makes his portfolio choice by maximizing his expected utility of terminal wealth using the
value function v (·) given in (1).
We make the following two additional assumptions which turn out to be crucial for predicting
that regret and pride causes individuals to behave according to the disposition eﬀect. In Section
4, we will discuss how deviations from these assumptions impact our results.
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Assumption 1 The individual only observes the realized stock return if he holds the stock.
This assumption is relevant for regret-averse individuals as foregone alternatives and their res-
olution can impact decisions. In our setup, it implies that the individual has the option to avoid
regret or forego pride by investing in the bond and not observing the realized return of the stock;
e.g., by not reading the newspaper. This relates to Bell (1983) who shows that it can be optimal for
a regret-averse individual to not have a foregone alternative lottery resolved. In fact, we will show
in Section 4 that observing stock returns after selling the stock leads to a lower level of expected
utility. This implies that if the individual has the choice to observe stock returns or not then it is
optimal in our setting for him not to observe them.
Assumption 2 If the individual’s decisions turn out to be ex-post optimal, i.e. they imply the
maximum level of wealth with respect to the realized returns, then he experiences pride
towards the foregone worst alternative (FWA), i.e. towards the lowest level of wealth he
could have obtained with respect to the realized returns. If the individual’s choices turn out
to be ex-post suboptimal, then he incurs regret towards the foregone best alternative (FBA),
i.e. towards the level of wealth he would have obtained from the ex-post optimal choices. We
assume the investor feels regret/pride for all past decisions including the current one; that is,
the FWA and FBA is derived with respect to all decisions up to and including the current
one.
This assumption addresses the issue of how the feeling of regret and pride interact and accumu-
late over time. A decision rule might turn out to be optimal over the first period but suboptimal
over the second period. Here, we assume that the feeling of regret is stronger than pride in the
sense that the individual incurs regret as long as one decision turns out to be ex-post sub-optimal.
In other words, the individual incurs pride only if all decisions turn out to be ex-post optimal. In
that case, we assume that his additional utility from pride is measured in reference to the FWA.
8
3 Optimal Portfolio Choice and the Disposition Eﬀect
In this section, we examine how an individual who is prone to feelings of regret and pride makes
decisions in a dynamic portfolio choice problem. In the first subsection, we investigate the optimal
decision at t = 1 under the assumption that the individual invested into the stock at t = 0. We
show that the disposition eﬀect can emerge as the optimal strategy; conditional on a positive stock
return over the first period, it is optimal to sell the stock at t = 1 and vice versa. We follow Hens
and Vlcek (2005) by calling this the “ex-post” disposition eﬀect as it presumes that the individual
bought the stock in the first place. In the second subsection, we then solve for the optimal choice
at t = 0 and show that the “true” disposition eﬀect can emerge as an optimal strategy. That is,
it can be optimal for the investor to buy the stock at t = 0, and then sell it at t = 1 if it went up
or hold it if it went down over the first period. Regret and pride can therefore help explain the
true disposition eﬀect as opposed to loss aversion which has been shown to only explain the ex-post
disposition eﬀect (Hens and Vlcek, 2005, Barberis and Xiong, 2006).
3.1 The Ex-Post Disposition Eﬀect
In this section, we assume that the investor bought the stock at t = 0, i.e. his level of wealth
at t = 1 is given by w˜1 = w0 (1 + x˜1) which can take the two values w+1 = w0 (1 + x
+) > w0 or
w−1 = w0 (1 + x
−) < w0 depending on whether the stock went up or down over the first period.
The following proposition determines the condition under which it is optimal for the individual
follow the disposition strategy.
Proposition 1 Suppose the individual bought the stock at t = 0. It is then optimal for the
individual with γ 6= 1 at t = 1 to sell the stock if it went up and to keep the stock if it went down
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over the first period if and only if stock returns satisfy the following two conditions
(w0 (1 + x
+))
1−γ
1− γ
³
p
¡
1 + x+
¢1−γ
+ (1− p)
¡
1 + x−
¢1−γ − 1´+ gÃw1−γ0
1− γ
³
1−
¡
1 + x+
¢1−γ´!
< pg
Ã
w
1−γ
0
1− γ
³
1−
¡
1 + x+
¢2(1−γ)´!
+ (1− p) g
Ã
(w0 (1 + x
+))
1−γ
1− γ
³
1−
¡
1 + x−
¢1−γ´! (4)
and
(w0 (1 + x
−))1−γ
1− γ
³
p
¡
1 + x+
¢1−γ
+ (1− p)
¡
1 + x−
¢1−γ − 1´+ gÃw1−γ0
1− γ
³
1−
¡
1 + x−
¢1−γ´!
> pg
Ã
(w0 (1 + x
+))
1−γ
1− γ
³
1−
¡
1 + x−
¢1−γ´!
+ (1− p) g
Ã
w
1−γ
0
1− γ
³
1−
¡
1 + x−
¢2(1−γ)´! . (5)
For γ = 1, i.e. u (w) = ln (w), the conditions are
ln
³¡
1 + x+
¢p ¡
1 + x−
¢1−p´
+ g
¡
− ln
¡
1 + x+
¢¢
< pg
¡
−2 ln
¡
1 + x+
¢¢
+ (1− p) g
¡
− ln
¡
1 + x−
¢¢
(6)
and
ln
³¡
1 + x+
¢p ¡
1 + x−
¢1−p´
+ g
¡
− ln
¡
1 + x−
¢¢
> pg
¡
− ln
¡
1 + x−
¢¢
+ (1− p) g
¡
−2 ln
¡
1 + x−
¢¢
.
(7)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Condition (4) implies that selling the stock after it went up over the first period is optimal. It
depends on the equity premium and the relative strengths of the certain feeling of pride when selling
the stock versus the uncertain feelings of additional pride or regret when holding the stock over
the second period. Condition (5) assures that keeping the stock after it went down over the first
period is optimal. Again, this condition depends on the equity premium and the relative strengths
of the certain feeling of regret when selling the stock versus the uncertain feelings of additional or
less regret when holding the stock over the second period. Optimal behavior is thus consistent
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with the disposition eﬀect if both conditions hold.
We provide intuition for why both conditions can hold by focusing on the eﬀects of the following
two interrelated changes on the optimal choice: increasing the equity premium and adding antici-
pated regret and pride to the decision making, i.e. the second attribute of the utility function v (·)
in (1). Considering the first attribute of the utility function, u (·), increasing the equity premium
makes keeping the stock at t = 1 more attractive, independent of the stock’s movement over the
first period. For a fixed equity premium, adding the second attribute, −g(u(walt)− u (w)), makes
selling the stock at t = 1 more attractive, again independent of the stock’s movement over the
first period. This is due to the convexity of g (·) as the individual prefers a certain level of regret
and pride by selling the stock to an uncertain exposure of regret and pride by keeping the stock.
In other words, an individual who considers anticipated regret and pride in his decision making
requires a higher equity premium for keeping the stock than an individual whose preferences do
not include these psychological factors.
The crucial eﬀect that implies diﬀerent behavioral responses to the stock’s movement over the
first period arises from the diﬀerent eﬀects that a marginal increase in the equity premium has on
regret and pride, i.e. on the second attribute of the utility function. If the stock went down over the
first period, then the individual will only feel regret but no pride as he already made a suboptimal
decision at t = 0 (see Assumption 2). If the stock went up, however, then the individual will either
only feel pride if he sells the stock or expose himself to either regret or more pride if he keeps the
stock. Marginally increasing the equity premium will impact the diﬀerences in the marginal eﬀects
between selling and keeping the stock. If this diﬀerence is larger after an up-move of the stock over
the first period than after a down-move, then selling the stock would be marginally more attractive
after an up-move which can imply optimal consistent with the disposition eﬀect.
To focus on those eﬀects, suppose that γ = 1, i.e. u (w) = ln (w), p = 1/2, and that we increase
the equity premium by marginally increasing the positive return, x+, while keeping the negative
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return, x−, fixed.1 If the stock went down over the first period, there is no eﬀect on the impact
of the second attribute as it solely depends on x− (see lower limit in (7)). Conversely, if the stock
went up, the convexity of g (·) implies that the marginal increase in pride when selling the stock
is larger than the potential marginal increase in pride when keeping the stock (see (6)). Thus
increasing the equity premium makes selling more attractive than buying when the stock has gone
up over the first period while having no eﬀect when the stock has gone down. As a result, there
arises situation in which anticipated regret and pride induces behavior which is consistent with the
disposition eﬀect.
These marginal eﬀects on the psychological factors have to be traded-oﬀ against the marginal
eﬀect that an increase in the equity premium has on the first attribute, i.e. the increased attrac-
tiveness of keeping the stock. Condition (4) implies that the benefit of securing pride at t = 1 by
selling the stock outweighs the cost and benefit of regret or additional pride and the risk premium
when keeping the stock. Condition (5) implies that the risk premium is high enough to compensate
the individual for the additional spread in regret incurred when keeping the stock. In Section 3.3,
we will show with an illustrative example that both conditions (4) and (5) can be satisfied.
3.2 The True Disposition Eﬀect
In this section, we examine the dynamically optimal behavior of the individual with the preferences
specified above. We thus endogenize the decision at t = 0 compared to the section above. Let
us emphasize again that this proved to be crucial for the attempt to explain the disposition eﬀect
by loss aversion. Although loss aversion can explain the ex-post disposition eﬀect (Gomes, 2005,
Kyle et al, 2006), it cannot explain the true disposition eﬀect (Hens and Vlcek, 2005, Barberis
and Xiong, 2006). In contrast to loss aversion, we show in the following proposition that regret
and pride can explain the true disposition eﬀect which is buying the stock at t = 0 and behaving
according to the ex-post disposition eﬀect at t = 1. Furthermore, the necessary and suﬃcient
1Equivalent results obtain for γ 6= 1 and/or increasing the equity premium by marginally increasing x− while
keeping x+ fixed.
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conditions on stock returns for the true disposition eﬀect to hold are equivalent to the necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for the ex-post disposition eﬀect to hold, i.e. conditions (4) and (5).
Proposition 2 It is optimal for the individual at t = 0 to buy the stock and at t = 1 to sell the
stock if it went up and to keep the stock if it went down over the first period if and only if stock
returns satisfy conditions (4) and (5).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Therefore, in a dynamic portfolio choice problem, for a certain range of stock returns, i.e. under
conditions (4) and (5), it is optimal for an investor who is prone to feeling regret and pride to follow
the disposition eﬀect strategy. That is, when the stock value rises, the investor sells the stock and
when the stock value decreases, he holds the stock. The range of stock returns for this strategy
to be optimal is the same for both the ex-post and true disposition eﬀect. This implies that the
individual’s behavior is time-consistent. Under conditions (4) and (5), the investor optimally plans
at t = 0 to follow the disposition eﬀect strategy at t = 1 (Proposition 2) and at t = 1 optimally
executes this strategy (Proposition 1).
3.3 An Illustrative Example
The objective of providing an illustrative example is to show that the set of stock returns that
satisfy the necessary and suﬃcient conditions (4) and (5) is non-empty. Suppose γ = 1, p = 12 and
that the function g (·) is given by g(x) = exp(x)−1. Then conditions (4) and (5) are equivalent to
−x−
(1 + x−)2
< ln
¡¡
1 + x+
¢ ¡
1 + x−
¢¢
<
x+2 − 2x+x− − x−
(1 + x+)2 (1 + x−)
.
In Figure 1, the lower line represents all level of stock returns y = x+ and x = x− such that the
lower constraint is binding. Analogously, the upper line represents the upper constraint. Thus,
for any pair of stock returns (x+, x−) that falls between those two lines the individual optimally
follows the disposition strategy. Otherwise, for any pair of stock returns (x+, x−) that is below
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the lower line it is optimal at t = 1 to sell the stock independent of the stock’s movement over the
first period. Equivalently, for any pair of stock returns (x+, x−) that is above the upper line it is
optimal at t = 1 to buy the stock independent of the stock’s movement over the first period.
0-0.1-0.2-0.3-0.4
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
x
y
Figure 1: This graph plots for γ = 1, p = 1/2, and g(x) = exp(x)− 1 the constraints on stock
returns in conditions (4) and (5) which are neccesary and suﬃcient for the disposition eﬀect to
hold.
4 Discussion of Assumptions
In this section, we discuss the importance of the assumptions made to explain the disposition eﬀect
and give intuition about why deviations from those assumptions change the predictions. We focus
on the ex-post disposition eﬀect as this is a necessary step in explaining the true disposition eﬀect.
The ex-post disposition eﬀect would be reinforced by changes in the assumptions that would make
selling the stock more attractive after it went up and make holding the stock more attractive after
it went down over the first period.
The first assumption considers whether the individual observes stock returns even if he does
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not hold it in his portfolio.
Assumption 1 The individual only observes the realized stock return if he holds the stock.
By comparing the levels of expected utility as in the proof of Proposition 1, it can be shown
that observing stock returns implies the opposite optimal decision after the stock went up, i.e. it
becomes optimal for the individual to keep the stock. This holds for any deviations in Assumption
2 that we discuss below.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Suppose the individual observes stock returns
after selling the stock. Since he will observe the realization of the foregone alternative, he is exposed
to a spread in feelings of regret and pride over the next period. As the function g (·) is convex,
the individual’s level of expected utility is lower when being exposed to this spread compared to
the situation in which he does not observe stock returns after selling and is thereby not exposed to
this spread. Note that when holding the stock the individual necessarily observes stock returns as
they impact his level of wealth. Hence, observing stock returns makes selling less attractive and
leads to the opposite optimal decision after the stock went up over the first period, i.e. it is not
optimal to follow the disposition strategy.
This also implies that if the individual has the choice to observe stock returns or not, then it
is optimal in our setting for him to not observe them and follow the disposition strategy under
conditions (4) and (5). This relates to the result of Bell (1983) who shows that it can be optimal
for a regret-averse individual, i.e. with a convex function g (·), to not have a foregone alternative
lottery resolved.
The second assumption relates to the “reference” level of wealth, walt, towards which the indi-
vidual feels regret or pride.
Assumption 2 If the individual’s decisions turn out to be ex-post optimal, i.e. they imply the
maximum level of wealth with respect to the realized returns, then he experiences pride
towards the foregone worst alternative (FWA), i.e. towards the lowest level of wealth he
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could have obtained with respect to the realized returns. If the individual’s choices turn out
to be ex-post suboptimal, then he incurs regret towards the foregone best alternative (FBA),
i.e. towards the level of wealth he would have obtained from the ex-post optimal choices. We
assume the investor feels regret/pride for all past decisions including the current one; that is,
the FWA and FBA is derived with respect to all decisions up to and including the current
one.
In a dynamic setting, some decisions will elicit regret and others pride. This raises the interest-
ing question how those feelings interact and aggregate. We assume that the individual only incurs
the feelings of pride if he has made choices that are all optimal after the fact. He then feels pride
towards the FWA which includes all decisions in the past and the current one. If one decision,
either in the past or the current one, is sub-optimal then the individual incurs regret towards the
FBA. We discuss the following two deviations from Assumption 2 under both Assumption 1 and
its deviation.
First, suppose the individual only considers regret in his decision making but not pride. Sugden
(1993) and Quiggin (1994) provide an axiomatic foundation for regret in which the individual’s
disutility from regret depends only on the actual level of wealth and the level of wealth associated
to the FBA. This change in assumption only potentially eﬀects the decision after the stock went
up over the first period as only then the individual can incur pride. By comparing the levels of
expected utility, it can be shown that by not considering pride, selling the stock becomes relatively
less attractive compared to keeping the stock. Furthermore, this eﬀect implies that it is then never
optimal to follow the ex-post disposition strategy.
The intuition is that when keeping the stock, the individual only incurs pride if the stock went
up over the second period. When selling the stock the individual incurs a certain level of pride
(if he does not observe returns) or he incurs pride if the stock goes down over the second period
(if he observes returns). In both cases, the convexity of g (·) implies that the ex-ante value of
foregone pride is smaller when keeping the stock compared to the ex-ante value when selling the
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stock. Note that in the latter case in which the individual observes all stock returns, it is more
valuable incurring pride when the stock goes down compared to when it goes up over the second
period. Not considering pride makes therefore selling the stock relatively less attractive compared
to keeping it.
Second, suppose that past decisions do not matter with respect to the anticipated feeling of
regret or pride, i.e. at t = 1 the individual only considers the current decision when evaluating
those feelings and not his decision at t = 0. By comparing the levels of expected utility, it can
be shown that by only considering the current decision selling the stock becomes relatively less
attractive after it went up but relatively more attractive after it went down over the first period
compared to keeping the stock. Furthermore, this eﬀect implies that it is then never optimal to
follow the ex-post disposition strategy.
The intuition behind this result is similar to above. After the stock went up over the first
period, not considering the pride from the initial decision at t = 0 takes relatively more pride away
when selling the stock compared to keeping it. As argued above, this is implied by the convexity
of g (·). However, after the stock went down, the disutility from regret is larger when keeping the
stock compared to selling it. Not considering regret from the initial decision at t = 0 thus makes
selling relatively more attractive.
We conclude that these deviations from Assumptions 1 and 2 make selling the stock less attrac-
tive after it went up and potentially make keeping the stock less attractive after it went down over
the first period. Those eﬀects work against the disposition strategy and imply its non-optimality.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are thus crucial for explaining the disposition eﬀect with investors’ feelings
of regret and pride.
5 Conclusion
Prior empirical analyses have shown that trading patterns in capital markets exhibit the disposition
eﬀect, and current theoretical work seems to suggest that loss aversion does not explain this eﬀect.
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In this paper, we show that investors who feel regret and pride may exhibit trading behavior that
is consistent with the disposition eﬀect.
Understanding how regret and pride aﬀect investors’ trading behavior and the disposition eﬀect
enables us to learn more about the potential “costs” these investors may incur, which is especially
relevant for the current debate about introducing Personal Retirement Accounts (PRAs) to the
Social Security system. Dhar and Zhu (2002) have shown that investors with less trading experience
and/or lower income exhibit a stronger disposition eﬀect, which may lead to lower after tax returns.
The introduction of PRAs would thus lead to a much more pronounced disposition eﬀect in capital
markets and provides a rationale for policymakers to protect investors with such demographic
characteristics. It is therefore important to understand individuals’ trading behavior and the
factors that aﬀect it, which we do here with regard to regret and pride.
Further extensions include generalizations of the model shown here. Considering multiple time
periods and a general probability distribution of stock returns are avenues we aim to explore. Also,
it would be interesting to allow the investor to divide his wealth between the stock and bond instead
of examining an indivisible asset. Even though those extensions will add other eﬀects, we believe
that the basic result of this paper still holds: avoiding regret and seeking pride can help explain
the disposition eﬀect.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose the stock went up over the first period such that the individual’s level of wealth at t = 1 is
w+1 = w0 (1 + x
+) > w0. If he sells the stock then Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the individual incurs
additional utility at t = 2 from pride about his decision at t = 0. Note that Assumption 1 implies that
the individual does not observe the realization of the stock at t = 2 and thereby foregoes potential regret
or additional pride over the second period. The FWA would have been to not invest in the stock at t = 0
which yields walt = w0. His final level of utility from selling the stock is thus
(w0 (1 + x
+))
1−γ
1− γ − g
Ã
w
1−γ
0
1− γ −
(w0 (1 + x
+))
1−γ
1− γ
!
.
If the individual keeps the stock at t = 1 he either incurs additional pride if the stock went up again over
the second period or regret if it went down. In the first case, Assumption 2 implies that the individual
incurs pride towards the FWA which is not to have invested at all, i.e. walt = w0. In the latter case, the
individual made the optimal choice at t = 0 but the sub-optimal choice at t = 1. Assumption 2 implies
that, in aggregate, the individual incurs regret towards the FBA which is to have invested in the stock at
t = 0 and sold it at t = 1 yielding walt = w0 (1 + x+). His final level of expected utility is then
p

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³
w0 (1 + x
+)
2
´1−γ
1− γ − g

w
1−γ
0
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
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
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!!
Selling the stock at t = 1 is preferred by the individual if and only if
(w0 (1 + x
+))
1−γ
1− γ
³
p
¡
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¢1−γ − 1´+ gÃw1−γ0
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Ã
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0
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³
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+ (1− p) g
Ã
(w0 (1 + x
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1− γ
³
1−
¡
1 + x−
¢1−γ´!
. (8)
Now suppose the stock went down over the first period. If the individual sells the stock at t = 1 he incurs
regret about his decision at t = 0 which leads to a final level of utility
(w0 (1 + x
−))
1−γ
1− γ − g
Ã
w
1−γ
0
1− γ −
(w0 (1 + x
−))
1−γ
1− γ
!
.
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If he keeps the stock then Assumption 2 implies that he will incur regret independent of the stock movement
over the second periods as he made a sub-optimal choice once at t = 0. The level of expected utility is then
p
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Keeping the stock at t = 1 is preferred to selling it if and only if
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Note that the right-hand side of inequality (9) is positive as g is increasing. Both conditions (8) and (9)
must be satisfied for the ex-post disposition strategy to be optimal.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Following the true disposition strategy yields a level of expected utility
p
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Next, examine all possible other strategies and compare their level of expected utility with the one derived
from the true disposition strategy.
1. The individual invests in the stock only once which yields a level of expected utility
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The true disposition strategy is preferred to this strategy if and only if
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which is equivalent to condition (5).
2. The individual invests twice into the stock which yields a level of expected utility
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The true disposition strategy is preferred to this strategy if and only if
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which is equivalent to condition (4).
3. The individual does not invest in the stock at all which yields a level of utility
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The true disposition strategy is preferred to this strategy if and only if
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which is equivalent to
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Condition (10) is equivalent to
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Condition (10) is thus stronger than condition (12) if
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The RHS of this inequality is negative. If 1− (1− p) (1 + x−)1−γ < 0 then the LHS is positive and
the inequality (13) is satisfied. Suppose now that 1 − (1− p) (1 + x−)1−γ > 0. The convexity of g
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implies
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The last inequality follows from the condition
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The LHS of inequality (13) is therefore positive and thus satisfied which implies that condition (10)
is stronger than condition (12).
4. The individual invests in the stock at t = 0 and at t = 1 keeps the stock if it went up or sells the stock
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if it went down over the first period. This strategy yields a level of expected utility
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The true disposition strategy is preferred to this strategy if and only if
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Conditions (10) implies
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Combining these two inequalities yields condition (14).
Conditions (10) and (11) are thus necessary and suﬃcient for the true disposition eﬀect to hold and are
equivalent to those for the ex-post disposition eﬀect to hold, i.e. conditions (5) and (4).
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